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Abstract 
The premature mortality of female children is an alarming demographic outcome in many 
countries of the world. The most popular explanation for this phenomenon is the 
prevalence of son preference. However, empirical findings indicate that the assumption of 
a positive relationship between wanted daughters and female children’s survival is not 
found in every scenario, and it does not have a clear explanation in the literature. To fill 
this gap, we present a simple model that provides insights into how the positive marginal 
effect of wanted daughters on their survival might decrease with higher societal 
discrimination against young females. The model draws on the emerging literature that 
examines the erosion of cognitive and noncognitive skills that result from poverty and 
discrimination. Our theoretical findings are tested for the case of India, using the third 
round of the National Family Health Survey, with zero-inflated Poisson models. Our 
estimates provide support for the interaction of parents’ preferences and societal 
discrimination against female children. In particular, we show that the statistical 
significance of the marginal effect of wanted daughters on their survival disappears in 
contexts of high societal discrimination against female children. Our study contributes to 
the literature by questioning the commonly held assumption of additive separability 
between the effect of family and societal characteristics. One central implication is that the 
alleviation of poverty alone might fail to automatically reduce sex-based discriminatory 
practices, and that multidimensional interventions are required that target the individual 
and society.     
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The missing link between parents’ preferences and daughters’ survival: The 
moderator effect of societal discrimination 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Millions of women are missing because of discriminatory practices carried out all over the 
world (Anderson & Ray, 2010; Sen, 1992). An alarming type of discrimination is 
intrahousehold discrimination against female children (Lin, Liu, & Qian, 2014; Mangyo, 
2008; Oster, 2009a; Qian, 2008; Rohlfs, Reed, & Yamada, 2010; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 
1982).  
 
The most popular explanation for the intrahousehold discrimination against young females 
is the prevalence of son preference (Lin et al., 2014; Pande, 2003). It is argued that son 
preference results in a biased allocation of the scarce time, energy and resources needed to 
fight against the avoidable morbidity and premature mortality of female children. 
However, recent empirical findings indicate that the positive relationship between son 
preference and female child deprivation is not so straightforward. In India, for instance, a 
decline in the number of unwanted girls across all socioeconomic groups (Retherford & 
Roy, 2003) has failed to be associated with a decrease in the mortality of young females 
(Mukherjee, 2013). Another troublesome finding results from examining the effect of sex-
selective abortions on young girls’ survival. Sex-selective abortions, which reduce the 
number of unwanted girls, as well as the number of girls that are raised in large families 
and in poor conditions, are expected to improve the health conditions and survival of 
young girls (Lin et al., 2014). However, in many scenarios, this relationship fails to arise 
(Nandi, 2014; Shepherd, 2008). Nandi (2014) finds, for instance, that a reduction in sex-
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selective abortions, as result of the ban on prenatal sex diagnostics, and which would have 
increased the number of unwanted girls, had no impact on the mortality of young girls in 
Maharashtra (India). 
 
Although important steps have been taken to better understand the complex relationship 
between preferences and discrimination against young females (Rohlfs et al., 2010), to our 
knowledge, no study has yet provided a comprehensive explanation of why, contrary to 
what was expected, the positive relationship between the number of wanted female 
children and their survival is not found in every scenario. The reason why previous works 
provide an unsatisfactory explanation of this phenomenon could rest on the lack of 
comprehensive theoretical analysis of the particularities of human behavior under 
circumstances of societal discrimination and poverty (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006). In 
particular, further analysis should be conducted on the role played by societal 
discrimination on the relationship between parents’ preferences and child survival.  
 
To overcome this shortcoming, we incorporate recent insights from the psychology of 
poverty and discrimination literature (Dercon & Singh, 2012; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; 
Pasquier-Doumer & Risso-Brandon, 2015; World Bank, 2015) on the study of 
intrahousehold discrimination. Poverty, stigma and discrimination undermine cognitive 
and noncognitive performance, and limit a person’s aspirations (Ghosal, Jana, Mani, Mitra, 
& Roy, 2013; Hoff & Pandey, 2006). The analysis of the person’s own aspirations and the 
aspirations for others is very important if inter and intra-generational poverty and 
discriminatory trap wants to be understood and overcome. For instance, in a study carried 
out in Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam, Dercon and Singh (2013) found a robust 
6 
 
relationship between parents’ aspirations for the future of their children and the children’s 
own aspirations and achievements. 
 
Bringing these findings into our study, we argue that the overwhelming discrimination 
against young females might erode parents’ aspirations for the survival of their daughters, 
making them more likely to overlook health risks for their female children. Moreover, the 
poor performance of parents in the context of overwhelming societal discrimination against 
females might be reinforced by the human tendency to act in accordance with observed 
behavior (Kahneman, 2003). Parents exposed to sex-based discriminatory practices in their 
community might be prone to undertake prevalent discriminatory practices. Indeed, the 
propensity to replicate observed behavior is one of the main mechanisms that contributes 
to perpetuate discriminatory practices, even when the basis for discrimination has been 
removed from society (World Bank, 2015). In our context, parents who want boys and 
girls equally might still overlook the health of their daughters, because they take for 
granted the discriminatory practices of their community. We bring these insights into a 
simplified model of family decisions, and show how societal discrimination might 
moderate the relationship between the number of wanted girls and female child survival. 
Specifically, our model points to a decrease in the positive marginal effect of wanted 
female children on their survival, where there is greater societal discrimination against 
young females. The examination of this marginal effect sheds light on the particularities of 
the relationship between parents’ (cognitive and noncognitive) performance and the 
characteristics of the society, which in turn, we argue, are crucial for gaining a better 
understanding of the fundamentals of a sex-based discriminatory trap.  
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To validate our theoretical approach, an empirical analysis is carried out for the case of 
India, using the National Family Health Survey (2005–2006). Our estimates show that, 
holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural factors, having wanted daughters 
increases their survival. However, an interplay exists between the number of wanted 
daughters and societal discrimination against female children, so that the positive effect of 
wanted daughters on their survival is reduced with societal discrimination against female 
children. Indeed, the statistical significance of wanted daughters disappears in contexts of 
extremely high societal discrimination against female children. The results are robust to 
changes in specification, sample, year and variable definitions.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background of the 
paper. In Section 3, we present the data and methods. The empirical results are displayed in 
Section 4, and conclusions are given in Section 5.  
 
2. A psychology of discrimination perspective 
A great deal of research has been conducted to examine both the effect of parents’ son 
preferences and the effect of (sex- based) discriminatory institutions on the survival of 
children. On the one hand, parents might bear son preferences and allocate survival 
resources unequally between sons and daughters (Qian, 2008; Rohlfs et al., 2010; 
Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982). On the other hand, discriminatory institutions might limit 
what parents can do to fight for the survival of their female children (Branisa, Klasen, & 
Ziegler, 2013; Luke & Munshi, 2007), for example, through the characteristics of the 
social actors involved in the care of their children, such as physicians who could also bear 
son preferences (Patel, Badhoniya, Mamtani, & Kulkarni, 2013). However, less attention 
(if any) has been paid in this field to examine the effects of the interaction between 
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individuals’ preferences and their discriminatory socioeconomic and cultural context, to 
explain observed behavioral patterns in a society.   
 
Laboratory and field experiments carried out in different cultural environments 
demonstrate how discrimination and stigma foster negative psychological dispositions, and 
contribute to the erosion of cognitive and noncognitive skills of underprivileged 
individuals, which undermines the person’s potential. Hoff and Pandey (2006) show how 
the public revelation of the young boys’ social identity (the caste) in rural north India 
affected the cognitive task performance and ability to respond to economic opportunities of 
low-caste children. These authors found that as social identity was made public, the 
negative thoughts of underprivileged people increased, eroding their confidence, learning 
and trust in their own success. Ghosal et al. (2013) showed how the enhancement of 
psychological characteristics, such as the self-esteem of sex workers in Kolkata (India)—
while keeping invariant the amount of material resources that they were entitled to— made 
them more proactive, as shown by their savings choices and health-seeking behavior. 
Cohen, Garcia, Apfel and Master (2006) reduced the racial achievement gap (40 percent) 
of African-American students in a suburban school in the United States, as the 
experimenters enhanced the students’ sense of personal adequacy (see also Cohen, Garcia, 
Purdie-Aughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski 2009).  
 
The psychological mechanisms through which discrimination undermines the performance 
of underprivileged population are multifaceted. The pressure of dealing with poverty 
(Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013) and discrimination (Cohen et al., 2006, 2009; 
Hoff & Pandey, 2006) could overwhelm the human cognitive system based on reasoning 
and judgment, leading to low performance by the underprivileged. Discrimination might 
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also erode the person’s noncognitive skills.  Authors such as Appadurai (2004) or Ray 
(2006) identify a phenomenon called “the aspirations failure”; the gap between the 
person’s current aspirations and their own potential. The rise of a gap in aspirations with 
discrimination makes it possible that noncognitive skills contribute to the exacerbation of 
chronic deprivation (Ghosal et al., 2013). Going further in this direction, Dalton, Ghosal 
and Mani (2015) examine how the inability of human beings to internalize the long-term 
consequences of their actions (e.g., the long-term returns of effort) might be one of the 
main origins of aspiration failure, and the low effort levels undertaken by the 
underprivileged population.  
 
Attention is redirected by the psychologist Kahneman (2003) to the structure of the human 
mind. He supports the idea that the cognitive system, based on reasoning and judgment, 
coexists with another (automatic) system, comprising thoughts that come spontaneously to 
the person’s mind. The salience of the automatic cognitive system, which prioritizes shared 
understandings of a community (mental models), would contribute to the perpetuation of 
poverty and inequality (World Bank, 2015). By acknowledging that discriminatory 
environments might foster parents’ internal constraints  (e.g., aspiration failure for their 
daughters), or cause them to behave in accordance with shared (sex-based) discriminatory 
mental models, thus compromising the effort that parents devote to fight against the 
premature mortality of their daughters, we move to a framework that helps us to 
understand why the marginal effect of being wanted and surviving might fail to be constant 
across levels of societal discrimination against young females. We present a simplified 
model that sheds light on this relationship. 
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Holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural factors (including the level of 
discrimination in society), let us represent the relationship between the level in which 
parents want female children, denoted by 𝑤 ∈ [0,1],  and their success in avoiding 
premature mortality of their daughters by function 𝑓(𝑤), defined in (0,1], and satisfying 
𝑓(0) = 𝜖, 𝑓(1) = 1  and 𝑓′(𝑤) > 0, where 𝜖 > 0 is arbitrarily low. The outcomes of this 
function can be read as the percentage of success in avoiding the premature mortality of 
female children.  
 
Let now assume that societal discrimination against young girls (mediated by aspiration 
failure on daughters’ survival, and the propensity to act in accordance with observed 
behavior) affects parents’ performance. Then, for a given level of discrimination, the 
relationship between wanting female children and the success in avoiding the premature 
mortality of daughters would be represented by function     𝑓:̅ [0,1] → [0,1), such that 
𝑓(̅𝑤) = 𝑓(𝑤) − 𝜖. Generalizing the problem for a continuous range of societal 
discrimination against female children, we obtain the next result:  
Proposition 1. Let 𝑑 ∈ [0,1] represent the level of societal discrimination against female 
children in a given society. The relationship between the level in which parents want 
female children (w), and their success in avoiding the premature mortality of their 
daughters, can be represented by a function 𝑔: [0,1]2 → [0,1], such that 𝑔(𝑤,𝑑) is 
increasing in w (𝜕𝜕(𝑤,𝑑)
𝜕𝑤
> 0), decreasing in d (𝜕𝜕(𝑤,𝑑)
𝜕𝑑
< 0), and has a negative cross-
partial derivative (𝜕
2𝜕(𝑤,𝑑)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑑
< 0).  
 
Proposition 1 means that holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural factors, the 
positive marginal effect of having wanted daughters on the parents’ success in avoiding the 
premature mortality of their female children decreases with societal discrimination against 
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female children. In other words, the model shows how the optimal use of their scarce time, 
energy and resources could reduce the number of female deaths within the household. As a 
result, wanted daughters in the context of overwhelming discrimination would be neglected 
to a similar extent as unwanted girls are discriminated against.  Figure 1 illustrates this 
theoretical result. The Section 3 empirically examines the validity of Proposition 1.  
 
(FIGURE 1 HERE)   
 
3. Data and methods 
This section tests our theoretical findings for the case of India. This country is an adequate 
case study in our context, as shown by the historical preference for male children there 
(Bharati, Shome, Pal, Chaudhury, & Bharati, 2011; Clark, 2000; Sen, 1992). The analysis 
is based on household-level information obtained from the National Family Health Survey, 
complemented by information from other sources, such as the 2001 Census of India, and 
the Full Realization Rate (FRRR) of female children at state level, developed by Chaudhuri 
(2013).  
  
The high quality of the National Family Health Survey, which is the product of the most 
extensive demographic survey at both state and national levels, is widely acknowledged. 
The information compiled there is based on questionnaires from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys, which were modified appropriately to capture the Indian setting (Visaria 
& Irudaya-Rajan, 1999). It should be noted that, among the various sources that could 
account for the variables in this study, the National Family Health Survey best meets the 
requirements of our theoretical approach. This survey gathers information on family 
decisions, with an emphasis on children’s health and survival. Moreover, it provides 
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separate information for the estimation of how welcome a girl is within the family, as well 
as on gender bias in mortality, which is lacking in other datasets (e.g., Indian Census; see 
Echavarri & Ezcurra, 2010). In addition, it is worth mentioning that most of the empirical 
research on discrimination against young females in India is based on this dataset, 
facilitating the comparability of outcomes. 
 
The National Family Health Survey has been conducted three times since its inception in 
1992–93. The last survey covers the period 2005–2006, and includes interviews with 
124,385 women aged between 15 and 49 years, who are, or have been married. Following 
the standard procedure in household-level analysis, the target group is limited to mothers 
for whom childbearing is finished (Clark, 2000), which comprises 64,545 females, who 
account for a total of 211,004 births. Our sample is constrained to 43,576 females, who 
account for a total of 141,917 births, because our measure of societal discrimination 
against female children is not defined for all of the states in India. We conduct a robustness 
analysis employing other measures of societal discrimination against women that are 
defined for all the states included in the National Family Health Survey in Section 4.2.   
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The households 
report, on average, 0.08 daughters who died before their first birthday. However, mortality 
is concentrated in 6.98 percent of the households, some of which reported as many as 5 
female infant deaths. We also find evidence that some girls in our sample are unwanted. 
Approximately one-half (47.08 percent) of the families have an excess of female births, 
whose number varies between 1 and 9, and the average family has approximately 1 (0.80) 
unwanted daughter. As far as family size and composition is concerned, on average, 
women in the sample have three children (3.26), with a high probability that they have 
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more male than female births (the average proportion of sons is 0.55). On average, 0.1 of 
their sons died before their first birthday.  Regarding the socioeconomic characteristics of 
mothers in the sample, over 40 percent of them have no education (42.45), almost half live 
in urban areas (46.55). The majority are Hindu (80.74). The average durables owned by 
families are 1.96 out of 6. Regarding health indicators at state level, on average, over two-
thirds (66.98) of female children were not breastfed for at least twelve months after their 
birth, and did not receive all the basic vaccinations. However, these figures vary largely 
across the 14 states in the sample (from numbers below 50 percent in Kerala, Maharashtra, 
Punjab and Tamil Nadu, to levels that surpass 80 percent in Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh). 
 
Before continuing, it is worthwhile justifying the choice of the household as the unit of 
analysis. Our choice is based on the finest disaggregation level at which the moderator 
effect of social norms on parents’ behavior can be adequately evaluated using our dataset. 
To this end, we require a reliable measure of the level to which daughters are wanted. In 
the National Family Health Survey, women fail to report individual information on 
wanting children. Instead, they are asked about their ideal family gender-composition. One 
might estimate if a particular child is wanted or not by the assumption that, for each sex, 
parents want their children until they meet their fertility ideals, after which all others are 
unwanted. We do not follow this direction for several reasons. First, the estimation 
procedure implies a dichotomous division between wanted and unwanted children, which 
is far from the reality. Second, the procedure impedes accounting for the overall intensity 
of preferences. Finally, household-level estimates, which allow accounting for the intensity 
of son preference, are adequate to examine if societal discrimination against young females 
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moderates the relationship between mothers’ preferences and their (household aggregate) 
performance.   
 
(TABLE 1 HERE)   
 
3.1.Variables and Measurement 
Mortality of daughters. With regard to measuring the parents’ performance on avoiding 
deprivation, mortality provides a better measure than food intake (Sen, 1984). Using cohort 
0–1 as the focus of the analysis (Bhalotra, 2010; Nandi, 2014; Rohlfs et al., 2010; 
Shepherd, 2008), our dependent variable is defined by the number of daughters that die up 
to that age. The focus on the mortality of girls avoids over/underestimations due to 
biological differences in mortality of male and female children (for a deep analysis of the 
female biological advantage, see Drevenstedt, Crimmins, Vasunilashorn, &Finch, 2008, or 
Seifarth, McGowan, & Milne, 2012), or due to intentional and unintentional 
underreporting of female births and deaths (Clark, 2000; Das Gupta, Chung, & Shuzhuo, 
2009), while raising the need to control for parents’ ability to avoid infant mortality. 
Section 4.2 discusses the robustness of this definition by employing cohort 0–5 
(Bhattacharya, 2006; Murthi, Guio, & Drèze, 1995) and 0–10 in the analysis. 
 
 Unwanted daughters. To measure the extent to which mothers have unwanted daughters, 
we calculate the difference between the actual and the ideal number of daughters, and 
truncate it at zero. At this point, it should not be overlooked that this measure is based on 
stated information, opening up the possibility that people adapt their preferences in light of 
their actual family sex-composition. Despite this possibility, evidence shows that people 
fail to completely adjust ideal and actual numbers (Clark, 2000).   
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Societal discrimination against young females. Female status can be operationalized by 
measuring the capacity of females in a given society to achieve a full bundle of elementary 
rights. By doing so, one overcomes the problem associated with the potential trade-off 
between elementary human rights (Echavarri & Permanyer, 2008). In this spirit, Chaudhuri 
(2013) recently proposed a measure of societal status of females, based on the extent to 
which their human rights are fulfilled or violated in a given society. This measure is called 
the Full Rights Realization Rate (FRRR), and this is calculated for four life stages of 
females (infancy/childhood; early adolescence; late adolescence; and early adulthood), 
using the three waves of the National Family Heath Surveys of India. In particular, the 
infancy/childhood FRRR is given by the percentage of female children (aged 0–5) that 
fulfills the right to health. A child fulfills the right to health when she achieves both the 
right to breastfeed and the right to vaccination. The right to breastfeed is fulfilled when the 
child is put to the breast within the first 24 hours of birth and for 12 months (or the child’s 
age if they are younger than twelve months). The right to vaccination is fulfilled if the 
child is given the full basic vaccinations, following the guidelines of the World Health 
Organization. We use the percentage of young females in the state whose right to health is 
violated, to operationalize the societal discrimination against young females. Measures of 
female deprivation have been considered adequate to capture discriminatory outcomes 
(Branisa et al., 2012). Endorsing Chaudhuri’s procedure, our measure is given by 1- 
infancy/childhood FRRR. At this point, it is worth recalling that Chaudhuri’s index is 
computed for a subsample of Indian states (see Chaudhuri, 2013:69). Thus, to test against 
the possibility that our analysis suffers from sample bias, in section 4.2., we replicate the 
study, using alternative measures of societal discrimination against females that focus on 
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women, which in turn cover all states in the National Family Health Survey (see the 
robustness analysis in section 4.2.).  
 
Control variables. When studying female child deprivation, we should not forget that the 
survival of children in India depends strongly on factors such as socioeconomic 
characteristics and residence facilities (Drèze & Sen, 2002; Luke & Munshi, 2007). 
Accordingly, we study the effect of individual characteristics, such as age, education, 
family size, socioeconomic status, caste, religion, residence and geographic region. In this 
regard, females with no schooling (Bhalotra, 2010; Kravdal, 2004; Nandi, 2014), born in 
larger family sizes, who live in rural areas and in states located in north-northwest India 
appear to have less ability to fight against infant mortality (Bhattacharya, 2006; Murthi et 
al., 1995; Pande, 2003; see also Nandi, 2014, for evidence on the negative relationship 
between family size and child mortality). The ownership of durables is used as a proxy for 
family socioeconomic status, as it is associated with long-term household wealth. The 
ownership of durables is associated with the increased health of children (Pande, 2003), 
and reduced mortality (Shepherd, 2008), although investments in sons’ and daughters’ 
health may be unequal (Oster, 2009a).   
 
Less agreement exists, however, regarding the sign and significance of caste (Hoff & 
Pandey, 2006; Luke & Munshi, 2007), and religion (Dharmalingam & Morgan, 2004; 
Mukherjee, 2013). Findings from earlier studies support the presence of egalitarian 
traditions among scheduled tribes (Mitra, 2008), and egalitarian health investments among 
scheduled castes (Luke & Munshi, 2007). Nevertheless, these groups are found to suffer a 
higher incidence of childhood mortality (Mukherjee 2013; Murthi et al., 1995), which 
could reflect unequal access to survival resources throughout the country (Hoff & Pandey, 
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2006; Luke & Munshi, 2007). In a similar vein of discussion, while the prevalence of son 
preference appears to vary little by religion (Clark, 2000), differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics across religious groups might affect the outcomes (Dharmalingam & 
Morgan, 2004; Drèze & Murthi, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, we control for other discriminatory practices, such as base neglect in the 
household, or the practice of prenatal discrimination (e.g. sex-selective abortions). On the 
one hand, we operationalize the base neglect in the household by the number of sons who 
died before age one. In contexts in which boys are preferred over girls, neglect might also 
affect male children, the nature of discrimination being different by sex (Pande, 2003). 
Thus, we expect that higher base levels of child neglect are associated with increased 
numbers of female child deaths. On the other hand, we capture the effect of prenatal 
discrimination by controlling for the proportion of sons within the household. The family 
composition of those couples that undertook sex-selective abortions would be 
characterized by a high proportion of sons. If a trade-off between prenatal and postnatal 
discriminatory practices existed, we should find that a greater proportion of sons is 
associated with a reduced mortality of young females (Lin et al., 2014).  
 
Finally, taking into account that our dependent variable is the number of children that die 
before their first birthday, for comparative purposes, we control for the possibility that 
child-rearing up to that age is still unfinished. To this end, we include the number of 
children aged less than one in the household. We expect to find a negative relationship 
between the number of children under one and the number of daughters who died before 
their first birthday.    
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3.2. Econometric Model 
The choice of the empirical model rests on the nature of our dependent variable, which we 
have defined as the number of daughters who died before their first birthday. Apart from 
its discrete nature, it is worth noting that the domain of this variable lies within the set of 
nonnegative integers with cardinal values. In contrast to the classical linear model, these 
features can be captured by a standard Poisson model. However, as mentioned above, in 
93.02 percent of the households in our sample, there are no daughters who died before age 
one. Moreover, there are two different data-generating processes that seem to explain the 
zero outcomes: families whose daughters fail to be at risk of infant mortality; and families 
that are at risk, but manage to avoid infant mortality. In contrast with the Hurdle model 
(extension of Poisson to account for differences between zero and nonzero outcomes), 
Lambert’s (1992) Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) considers that the large number of zeros 
might result from the confluence of two data-generating processes (Hu & Jefferson, 2009).  
The specification for the probability of zero outcomes in our base empirical model includes 
education. Robustness checks on the specification for zero outcomes are performed in 
section 4.2. 
 
Before continuing, it is worth recalling that we use negative definitions for success and 
wanting female children. Thus, according to Proposition 1, we expect that the marginal 
effect of unwanted daughters on the expected number of daughter deaths satisfies the 
following properties: ∂E[m|uw,d,X]
∂uw
> 0, 𝜕𝜕[𝑚|𝑢𝑤,𝑑,𝑋]
𝜕𝑑
> 0 and 𝜕2𝜕[𝑚|𝑢𝑤,𝑑,𝑋]
𝜕𝑢𝑤𝜕𝑑
< 0, where m 
denotes mortality, uw unwanted girls, d is the societal discrimination against female 
children, and X is a vector of control variables. Section 4 presents our estimates. 
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4. Results 
The main results of our empirical study are shown in Table 2. The first section of the table 
provides the marginal effects on the predicted number of daughter deaths, at the mean of 
the regressors, and the standard errors in parentheses. The second section of this table 
displays the cross-partial derivative with respect to the number of unwanted daughters and 
societal discrimination against young females. The third section of Table 2 examines our 
empirical model. In particular, we include Vuong’s test of the Zero-Inflated Poisson model 
versus the standard Poisson model (Vuong, 1989), which appears to confirm that the Zero-
Inflated Poisson model provides a more satisfactory description of the data. Moreover, the 
measures of goodness-of-fit that are employed to compare nested specifications included in 
Table 2 (Akaike and Schwartz information criteria) reveal that the inclusion of parents’ 
ability to avoid infant mortality, and other socioeconomic variables, provides increased 
explanatory power, which confirms that it is the preferred specification in this context.  
  
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
Focusing on our base specification (column 3 of Table 2), the estimates support the fact 
that, holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural factors, and given the mean 
societal discrimination against female children (0.67), an increase in the number of 
unwanted daughters is associated with a 0.004 increase in the expected number of 
daughters’ deaths (p < 0.001). Regarding the effect of societal discrimination against 
young girls, holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural factors, and given the mean 
number of unwanted daughters within the household (0.80), our estimates support that 
increases in societal discrimination are associated with 0.045 increases in the expected 
number of daughters’ deaths (p< 0.001).  
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Moreover, our estimates lend support to the idea that an interaction exists between parents’ 
preferences and societal discrimination against young females. The estimate of the cross-
partial derivative with respect to unwanted daughters and societal discrimination against 
female children is -0.022 (p<0.001). Specifically, the interplay between our key variables 
leads us to reveal the next outcome: holding constant other socioeconomic and cultural 
factors, the marginal effect of having unwanted daughters on the expected number of 
young female deaths decreases with higher societal discrimination against young females 
(see Figure 2). In egalitarian contexts (first row of the attached table to Figure 2), an 
increase in the number of wanted (unwanted) daughters is associated with 0.009 increase in 
the survival (mortality) of young females (p<0.001). However, as societal discrimination 
increases, the effect of parents’ preferences would decrease up to disappear. According to 
our estimates, for levels of societal discrimination equal to or greater than eighty percent, 
the marginal effect of wanted (unwanted) daughters on survival (mortality) is not 
statistically significant (see the last three rows of the Table in Figure 2). These empirical 
findings are compatible with our theoretical analysis, supporting the idea that 
discriminatory environments against young females might raise parents’ internal 
constraints (e.g., aspiration failure for the future of their daughters), and/or cause parents to 
act automatically, in accordance with sex-based discriminatory mental models, 
compromising the effort undertaken to fight for the survival of their daughters.  
 
(FIGURE 2 HERE) 
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4.1. Marginal Effects of Additional Explanatory Variables 
Table 2 also provides information on the marginal effects of the remaining explanatory 
variables, with regard to explaining female mortality in childhood. Focusing on results 
related to our base specification (the third column of Table 2), the marginal effects 
calculated at the mean of the regressors indicate the following relationships: the predicted 
number of daughters’ deaths is 0.006 lower for women with schooling, than for those with 
no schooling (p < 0.005). This negative relationship between education and child mortality 
agrees with findings of the earlier literature (Bhalotra, 2010; Bhattacharya, 2006; Kravdal, 
2004; Murthi et al., 1995; Shepherd, 2008). In a similar vein, our estimates confirm that a 
larger family size is associated with greater mortality (Pande, 2003). We find that each 
increase in family size is associated with a 0.016 increase in the expected number of 
daughters’ deaths (p < 0.001). As expected, we find that the expected number of daughters’ 
deaths is lower (0.011 fewer deaths) in households that have not finished their child-
rearing (p<0.001). Regarding the base level of discrimination within the household, we 
find that each increase in sons’ deaths is associated with 0.005 more daughters’ deaths (p < 
0.001). Moreover, a greater amount of durables is associated with 0.003 fewer daughters’ 
deaths (p<0.001), which supports the idea that household socioeconomic status helps 
parents to fight against the avoidable mortality of children (Oster, 2009a; Pande, 2003; 
Shepherd, 2008).  
 
Concerning religion, the estimates suggest that the mortality of young females is greater 
among Hindus than among other religions. However, the estimates only point to the 
statistical significance (p< 0.001) of differences in the predicted mortality rates of Muslims 
(0.014 fewer deaths). Still, we acknowledge the importance of conducting qualitative 
studies, to arrive at a deeper understanding of how mortality varies by religion (Pande, 
22 
 
2003). Individual characteristics such as age and caste are not statistically significant 
(p>0.01), but the estimates suggest that mothers who belong to scheduled castes and tribes 
have more daughter deaths, supporting the idea that discrimination against scheduled 
castes and tribes (leading to unequal access to survival resources) persists throughout the 
country (Hoff & Pandey, 2006; Luke & Munshi, 2007; Mitra, 2008; Mukherjee, 2013). 
 
When we control for family size, the base of household mortality and the proportion of 
sons, the place of residence is weakly or not statistically significant. In any event, the 
predicted mortality of daughters is lower for urban households than for their rural 
counterparts (p>0.01), and lower for families who live in states located in southern India 
than it is for families living in northwest India (p<0.01), which agrees with previous 
findings in the literature (Mukherjee, 2013; Murthi et al., 1995). 
 
Finally, our estimates support the finding that a greater proportion of sons in the household 
is associated with fewer daughters deaths (0.064 less deaths), and the effect is statistically 
significant (p<0.001). This finding is compatible with the idea that a trade-off exists 
between prenatal and postnatal discriminatory practices (Lin et al., 2014), which might 
lead to a change in the trend of postnatal discrimination over time (Diamond-Smith & 
Bishai, 2015). 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
This section examines the extent to which the analysis is robust to variable definitions, the 
sample, year and choice of specification.  
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The role of age cohort in daughters’ mortality. The factors that help us to understand an 
excess of female mortality are likely to vary by children’s age (Anderson & Ray, 2010). 
Table 3 in the Appendix estimates the mortality of girls for larger age cohorts. Column 1 
presents the marginal effects of our central variables on the predicted number of daughters 
who died before age 5 years. Column 2 presents the effects for daughters who died before 
age 10 years. The estimates show that our results are robust to changes in age cohort. 
Indeed, there is no change in the statistical significance of our central variables (p<0.001), 
and neither is there any variation on the size of the marginal effect of unwanted daughters 
on their mortality (0.004 more daughter deaths). The size of the marginal effects of societal 
discrimination increases slightly, as does the size of the interplay between wanted 
daughters and societal discrimination against female children.  
 
Societal-discrimination measures. This subsection examines whether our main results are 
robust to alternative operationalization of sex-based discrimination. It is worth mentioning 
that the overall discrimination against females, in economics, is measured traditionally by 
the labor status of women. However, in some cases, greater female labor participation 
might fail to reflect greater female status, especially if (as is largely the case in India) they 
have no control over the outcomes of their work, or if their contribution to household 
income is undervalued (Mukherjee, 2013; Srinivasan, 2005). Bearing this limitation in 
mind, Drèze and Sen (2002) support the idea that a comprehensive understanding of the 
societal discrimination against women should not only account for women’s actions, but 
also for their capacity to act otherwise (e.g., without husbands’ permission). Endorsing 
Drèze and Sen’s (2002) proposal, discrimination regarding the capacity of wives to decide 
private aspects of their lives is measured by the percentage of married women aged 15–49 
years, who need permission to go to the market alone.  
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Bearing this in mind, we examine the effect of societal discrimination against women, 
using both measures of discrimination: the percentage of women that need permission to 
go to market alone (female freedom to act differently); and the percentage of women who 
do not participate in labor markets (female labor status). In particular, columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4 in the Appendix operationalize the societal discrimination against females by 
female freedom to act differently. Columns 3 and 4 of this same table operationalize the 
societal discrimination against females by female labor status (Mukherjee, 2013). For this 
purpose, the National Family Health Survey (round 3) is merged with information from the 
2001 Census , which makes it possible to calculate the work-participation rate of women 
(this information is available from the Government of India (see 
http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-common/censusdataonline.html).  
  
By focusing on overall discrimination, an extended sample can be employed (remember 
that societal discrimination against young females is available for 14 states in India). Thus, 
columns 1 and 3 are based on an extended sample of 64,545 women, and the data lend 
support to the idea that an interplay exists between mothers’ preferences and societal 
discrimination against females (p<0.001). Columns 2 and 4 replicate the analysis for our 
subsample of 43,576 women. By doing so, we observe that similar results would have been 
obtained by focusing on the extended sample.  
 
The role played by district level characteristics and survey year. The capacity of 
couples to fight against child mortality is strongly related to access to district facilities, 
such as health services (Oster, 2009a). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the 
National Family Health Survey (round 3) fails to provide district identification. Hence, the 
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effect of access to health services is examined by using the second round of this dataset, 
and outcomes are displayed in Table 5 in the Appendix. The marginal effect of wanted 
daughters on female children mortality does not vary in size and significance with the 
inclusion of access to health facilities and survey year. Moreover, the interplay between 
unwanted daughters and societal discrimination against female children is robust to the 
control for health facilities and survey year (p<0.001). However, neither societal 
discrimination against female children nor the access to health facilities are statistically 
significant (p>0.01), making it necessary to research further the relationship between the 
guarantee of female children’s right to health and access to health facilities (Oster, 2009a; 
Patel et al., 2013).    
  
Fertility and base level of family neglect. Fertility and our measure of base neglect in the 
household (i.e., the number of sons that died before their first birthday) might introduce 
multicollinearity, affecting the observed significance of our estimates. However, the 
omission of these variables might involve overestimation of our central variables. Table 6 
in the Appendix presents estimates of when fertility and sons’ deaths are omitted. The 
estimates show that, as expected, the effect of wanted girls and discrimination increases 
with the omission of family size and sons’ deaths, as they are positively correlated 
variables. To test the stability of our base-model estimates, we estimate our model using 
Poisson regression and Zero-inflated regression that differ from our base model on the 
zero-outcome specifications (see Table 7 in the Appendix). The marginal effects and 
standard errors in all of the regressions are nearly the same.  
 
 The zero-outcome specification. Table 7 in the Appendix shows that the estimates of our 
central variables are robust to changes in the specification for zero outcomes. Our baseline 
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model is the one that, according to both Akaike and Schwartz criteria, has greater 
explanatory power than models with alternative specifications for the zero outcome.  
  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In line with previous literature, our findings show that, controlling for other socioeconomic 
and cultural factors that might explain female children’s survival, the expected number of 
daughters’ deaths increases with societal discrimination against female children, and with 
the number of unwanted daughters within the family.  Our findings also show the existence 
of an interaction between parents’ preferences and their (sex-based) discriminatory 
socioeconomic and cultural context, which constitutes the contribution of this work to the 
understanding of female child mortality. In other words, our results show that neither the 
socio-economic context, nor the parents, but the interaction of parents’ preferences and 
their socio-economic context would explain the bias in female children’s survival. 
Specifically, our estimates point to a decrease in the positive marginal effect of having 
wanted (unwanted) daughters on the survival (mortality) of their female children, with 
societal discrimination against young females. Indeed, this marginal effect loses its 
statistical significance for levels of societal discrimination equal to or greater than eighty 
percent.  
 
Thus, our estimates support the argument that discrimination would raise a gap between 
parents’ current success to fight against the premature mortality of their female children, 
and their own potential to do so, taking into account their preferences and their 
socioeconomic and cultural context, and this gap increases with societal discrimination 
against young females. Our results are in line with the growing literature on development 
that emphasizes that “decision-making is the product of an interaction between mind and 
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context’” (World Bank, 2015:2).  Social influences can shape women’s opportunities and 
achievements through human disposition or propensities, without presupposing, 
necessarily, “a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
orchestrating action of a conductor” (Bourdieu, 1990:72).  
 
The psychologist Kahneman describes the social influences on behavior as the salience of 
a cognitive system that gives priority to “what [people] happen to see at a given moment” 
(Kahneman, 2003: 1469). Kahneman supports the idea that the architecture of the human 
mind can be characterized by the coexistence of two cognitive systems: one based on 
reasoning and judgment; and the other on effortless associative thinking. This means that 
people would be attracted by shared understandings and behavioral practices of their 
community, because they come quickly to their mind. Thus, in contexts of overwhelming 
discrimination against young girls, widespread sex-based discriminatory behavior and 
understandings would cause parents to be prone to neglect wanted and unwanted 
daughters. The combination of automatic and social thinking, and the presence of shared 
discriminatory mental models would therefore lead to the perpetuation of discrimination in 
a given society (World Bank, 2015).  
 
The cognitive system based on reasoning, combined with common behavioral bias, would 
also favor the perpetuation of discrimination. In a recent study, Dalton et al. (2015) 
examined how the failure to internalize the long-term returns of current decisions implies 
lower aspirations and achievements for people suffering from discrimination and poverty 
(compared with their own potential). In contexts of prevalent discrimination against young 
girls, the aspirations for daughters’ survival might be seriously reduced. A particular 
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person might value boys and girls equally, but they would hardly find the courage (or 
awareness) required to go against well-established behavioral patterns in their society 
(Echavarri & Ezcurra, 2010). Under these circumstances, one would observe that parents 
fail to engage in effort levels that would avoid the premature mortality of their wanted and 
unwanted daughters. The influence of social and psychological factors on people’s minds 
yields the possibility that unwanted girls, raised in egalitarian environments, survive more 
than wanted girls in nonegalitarian environments, holding constant the economic 
constraints on parents’ opportunities. Therefore, even though the material payoffs of 
allocating survival resources against girls decrease when daughters are wanted—and as a 
result, self-interested conscious practices against them decrease (Lin et al., 2014)—a 
couple that forms part of, and conforms to a society characterized by high societal 
discrimination against young females might still discriminate against wanted daughters. 
The findings of Maertens (2013) in the rural Indian context shed light on this point. The 
author shows how increments in perceived returns to higher education may not be enough 
to increase education investments in girls, due to the marital norms regarding the age of 
marriage, and the social perception of female incorporation into the job market. 
 
The present paper contributes to the literature on female child deprivation by 
demonstrating the need to remove the commonly held assumption of additive separability, 
between the effect of intrahousehold and societal factors on female children deprivation. 
The interaction of individual and societal characteristics might constitute a trap that 
perpetuates gender discrimination, thus contributing to the exacerbation of discrimination 
for current, but also for future generations, “in ways that make the effects of past 
discrimination persist over time” (Hoff & Pandey, 2006: 206).  
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The analysis of the interplay between individual dispositions and social conditions allows 
us to show how the constraints associated with female discrimination could extend beyond 
material deprivation, and other external constraints. One central implication is that the 
alleviation of poverty alone might fail to automatically reduce parents’ sex-based 
discriminatory practices. Interventions that impact parents’ mode of thinking and deciding 
are therefore necessary (Kahneman, 2003), which affect the shared mental models of their 
community (Jensen & Oster, 2009), or that raise the aspirations of the underprivileged 
population (Ghosal et al., 2013). Multidimensional and innovative interventions are 
adequate for this end. One example of how affecting mental models might lead to the 
diffusion of gender-egalitarian practices in a community is provided by Jensen and Oster 
(2009). The authors find that the introduction of cable television contributed to the increase 
of women’s status in rural India (lower acceptability of domestic violence and of son 
preference; increases in women’s autonomy and reduction in fertility). A great reduction in 
the expected amount of female mortality would result from simultaneously targeting 
parents’ material constraints, and the internal effects of evolving in discriminatory 
environments; for example, modifying the sex-based discriminatory mental models of 
parents by causing them to be in contact with egalitarian realities.  
 
While further research is needed, the central point is that public policies that act only on 
individual economic budget constraints, assuming only payoff-oriented behavior, and 
using only monetary incentives, could fail to reduce the expected number of young female 
deaths. Note that in underprivileged environments, even the diffusion of education might 
contribute to the diffusion of discrimination against unborn females (Echavarri & Ezcurra, 
2010). This important problem could be overcome if complementary measures, affecting 
shared mental models or raising aspirations for the future of daughters, were implemented 
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along with economic incentives. Further study of human psychology mechanisms are 
required, to better understand how a person translates discrimination at societal level into a 
poor alignment of their wants and actions. Future work in this field, on the evolutionary 
and iterative dynamics of discrimination at societal or community level and individual or 
family level, would be helpful in shedding light on the persistence of discrimination, and in 
identifying adequate combinations of public policies. 
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(TABLES AND FIGURES TO BE INSERTED IN THE TEXT) 
Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics, India 2005–2006. 
Sources: Societal discrimination against female children’ variable is obtained from Chaudhuri (2013), which is 
calculated from the National Family Health Survey (round 1); health facilities are calculated from the National 
Health Survey (round 2); female labor status is calculated from Census 2001; and the remaining variables are 
calculated from the National Family Health Survey (round 3). 
Variable name Definition Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Household      
Mortality of daughters Daughters who died before their first birthday 0 5 0.08 (0.32) 
Mortality of sons Sons who died before their first birthday 0 7 0.10 (0.36) 
Unwanted daughters  Total daughters born minus ideal number of daughters 0 9 0.80 (1.10) 
Age Mothers’ current age 15 49 34.48 (7.57) 
Family size Total number of children born 1 16 3.26 (1.72) 
Children under one Number of live children aged twelve months or less 0 3 0.08 (0.27) 
Durables Ownership of durables 0 6 1.97 (1.53) 
Proportion of sons Total sons born divided by total children born 0 1 0.55 (0.30) 
Education Dummy = 1 for mother that has no schooling   42.45  
Scheduled caste Dummy = 1 for mother that belongs to a scheduled caste   
19.10  
Scheduled tribe Dummy = 1 for mother that belongs to a scheduled tribe   
5.79  
Hindu (Reference group) mother that is Hindu   80.74  
Muslim Dummy = 1 for mother that is Muslim   11.91  
Christian Dummy = 1 for mother that is Christian   2.26  
Sikh Dummy = 1 for mother that is Sikh   3.13  
Religion other Dummy = 1 for mother that is not Hindu, Muslim, Christian or Sikh   
1.96  
Urban Dummy = 1 for mother that lives in urban area   46.55  
Northwest (Reference group) mother that lives in Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan.    
17.63  
East Mother that lives in Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal.   
18.72  
South Dummy = 1 for mother that lives in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu   
29.39  
Central Dummy = 1 for mother that lives in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.    
34.26  
District      
Health facilities Percentage of villages in the district with health facility in the village. 0 1 15.93 (21.89) 
State      
Societal 
discrimination against 
female children 
Percentage of female children that fails to be 
breastfed for twelve months from birth, and to be 
vaccinated.  
45 90 66.98 (14.55) 
Female freedom to act 
otherwise 
Percentage of women in the state that need 
permission to go to market alone 13.2 69.96 44.29 (13.15) 
Female labor status Percentage of women who do not participate in labor markets 64.9 84.60 73.73 (7.08) 
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Table 2: Zero-Inflated Poisson regression of female-children mortality.  
Sample of mothers aged 15–49, India 2005–2006.  
 Dependent variable: number of daughters who died before age 1 
Regressors: (1) (2) (3) 
Unwanted daughters (UD) 0.031*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Societal discrimination (D) 0.128*** (0.009) 0.100*** (0.009) 0.045*** (0.008) 
Mother’s age: (<20)       
20–24   0.036 (0.033) 0.015 (0.022) 
25–29   0.055 (0.035) 0.017 (0.023) 
30–34   0.074 (0.040) 0.020 (0.022) 
35–39   0.079 (0.042) 0.016 (0.021) 
40–44   0.098 (0.050) 0.015 (0.021) 
45–49   0.121 (0.060) 0.019 (0.023) 
Education: (School)       
No school   0.018*** (0.002) 0.006** (0.002) 
Family size     0.016*** (0.001) 
Children under one     -0.011*** (0.003) 
Sons’ deaths     0.005*** (0.001) 
Proportion of sons     -0.064*** (0.004) 
Durables   -0.006*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Caste: (Other)       
Scheduled caste   0.006* (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Scheduled tribe   0.008 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 
Religion: (Hindu)       
Muslim   -0.007* (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002) 
Christian   -0.011 (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) 
Sikh   -0.009 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) 
Other   -0.017** (0.006) -0.014* (0.005) 
Residence: (Rural)       
Urban -0.002*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) 
Geographic region: (Northwest)       
East -0.06 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 
South -0.012*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.007* (0.003) 
Central 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
Cross-partial derivative with  
respect to UD and D -0.027*** (0.003) -0.025*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.003) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 3,690.10(7)*** 3,172.98(21)*** 4,149.30(25)*** 
Vuong 3.78*** 4.09*** 3.32*** 
AIC 21,388.33 21,040.24 20,071.92 
BIC 21,466.47  21,248.62 20,315.02 
Observations 43,576 43,576 43,576 
Notes: In this table, the dependent variable is the number of daughters who died before age one. Columns present the 
marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths at the mean of the regressors. The infinite-difference method is used 
to compute the marginal effect of binary regressors. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. The cross-
partial derivative of the expected number of daughters’ deaths, with respect to unwanted daughters and societal 
deprivation against young females at the mean of the regressors, is presented in the second section of the table. The 
estimation employs the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. The specification for the probability of zero outcomes includes 
education in columns two and three. The likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-Square test compares the model specified in the 
corresponding column with the unconditional model. The p-value associated with this test informs if, as a whole, the 
model is statistically significant. The Vuong (1989) test compares the Zero-Inflated Poisson model versus the standard 
Poisson model: large positive (negative) values favor the Zero-Inflated Poisson (standard Poisson) model, while 
absolute values below 2 do not favor any model. Akaike information criterion (AIC) based on the likelihood 
framework, and Schwartz information criterion (BIC) based on the Bayesian framework compare nested models; lower 
values imply an increased explanatory power. * p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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FIGURE 1. 
 
 
(a) Figure represents the relationship between the level in which parents want female children and percentage 
of success in avoiding premature mortality of daughters for three different levels of societal 
discrimination, 𝑠1 < 𝑠2 < 𝑠3. Solid lines represent parents’ success, while dashed lines represent the 
potential success of parents. 
 
 
(b) Figure represents the relationship between societal discrimination against young females and 
marginal effect of wanted daughters on parents’ success in avoiding premature mortality of daughters. 
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FIGURE 2.  
 
 
 
 
Societal discrimination against 
female children 
Marginal effect of  
unwanted daughters  95% Conf. Interval 
0 0.0094*** 0.0069 0.0119 
0.1 0.0093*** 0.0069 0.0116 
0.2 0.0090*** 0.0068 0.0111 
0.3 0.0085*** 0.0065 0.0105 
0.4 0.0080*** 0.0059 0.0097 
0.5 0.0069*** 0.0051 0.0087 
0.6 0.0056*** 0.0038 0.0074 
0.7 0.0040*** 0.0022 0.0057 
0.8 0.0018 -0.0001 0.0038 
0.9 -0.0008 -0.0032 0.0016 
10 -0.0041 -0.0074 -0.0008 
Notes: The marginal effects of unwanted daughters refer to the marginal effects of 
unwanted daughters on the expected number of daughters’ deaths, and are calculated 
using the post-estimation results related to our baseline specification (see column 3 in 
Table 2), at the level of societal discrimination against female children specified in the 
horizontal axe in this figure/column 1 in this table, and the mean of the remaining 
regressors. * p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Robustness Analysis (I): Mortality of daughters using cohorts 0–5 and 0–10 as the focus of 
the analysis. Sample of mothers aged 15–49, India 2005–2006. 
  
 Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
 Number of daughters  who died before age 5 
 Number of daughters  
who died before age 10 
Regressors:      
Unwanted daughters (UD) 0.004*** (0.001)  0.004*** (0.001) 
Societal discrimination (D) 0.056** (0.009)  0.061*** (0.009) 
Cross-partial derivative 
derivative with UD and D -0.024*** (0.003) 
 -0.025***  (0.003) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
LR Chi-Square (df) 6,098.15 (25)***  6,457.79 (25)*** 
Vuong 2.49*  2.41* 
Observations: 43,576  43,576 
Notes: The columns present the marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths 
at the mean of the regressors. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. 
The estimation uses the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. The specification for the 
probability of zero outcomes includes education. The likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-
Square test compares the model specified in the corresponding column with the 
unconditional model. The p-value associated with this test informs whether, as a 
whole, the model is statistically significant. The Vuong (1989) test compares the 
Zero-Inflated Poisson model with the standard Poisson model: large positive 
(negative) values favor the Zero-Inflated Poisson (standard Poisson) model, while 
absolute values below 2 do not favor any model.  
* p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Table 4: Robustness Analysis (II): Measures of societal discrimination against females. Sample of 
mothers aged 15–49, India 2005–2006. 
  Dependent variable: number of daughters who died before age 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressors:         
Unwanted daughters 
(UD) 
0.003***  (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Female freedom to  
act otherwise (FF) 
0.035*** 
 
(0.006) 0.019*** (0.009)     
Female labor status 
(LS) 
    0.022 (0.009) -0.006 (0.015) 
Cross-partial 
derivative derivative 
with UD and FF or LS 
 
-0.009** 
 
(0.003) 
 
-0.016*** 
 
(0.004) 
 
-0.011** 
 
(0.004) 
 
-0.019** 
 
(0.005) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR Chi-Square 5,602.81(25)*** 4,107.10(25)*** 5,576.21(25)*** 4,110.92(25)*** 
Vuong 3.42*** 3.25*** 3.52*** 3.27*** 
Observations: 64,545 43,576 64,545 43,576 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of daughters who died before age one. Discrimination that 
women suffer is included in all columns of this table, which is measured by the percentage of women in 
the state that need permission to go to market alone in columns 1 and 2, while it is measured by the 
percentage of women that fail to participate in labor markets in the state in columns 3 and 4. The 
columns present the marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths at the mean of the regressors. 
Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. The cross-partial derivative of the expected 
number of daughters’ deaths with respect to an excess of female births, and societal discrimination at 
the mean of the regressors, is presented in the second section of the table. The estimation employs the 
Zero-Inflated Poisson model. The specification for the probability of zero outcomes includes education. 
The likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-Square test compares the model specified in the corresponding column 
with the unconditional model. The p-value associated with this test informs whether, as a whole, the 
model is statistically significant. The Vuong (1989) test compares the Zero-Inflated Poisson model with 
the standard Poisson model: large positive (negative) values favor the Zero-Inflated Poisson (standard 
Poisson) model, while absolute values below 2 do not favor any model.  
* p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Table 5: Robustness Analysis (III): Role of district health facilities and survey year.  
Sample of mothers aged 15–49, India 1998–1999. 
  Dependent variable: number of daughters who died before age 1 
 (1) (2) 
Regressors:     
Unwanted daughters (UD) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001) 
Societal discrimination (D) 0.032** (0.010) 0.016 (0.011) 
District health facilities   -0.021 (0.006) 
Cross-partial derivative derivative 
with respect to UD and D 
 
-0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
 
-0.055*** 
 
(0.004) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
LR Chi-Square 4,685.06(25)*** 4,466.87(26)*** 
Vuong 2.08 2.00 
AIC 22,372.48 21,489.25 
BIC 22,612.79 21,735.81 
Observations: 39,437 39,437 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of daughters who died before age one. District 
health facilities variable is the percentage of villages in the district with their own health 
facility. The columns present the marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths at the 
mean of the regressors. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. The cross-
partial derivative of the expected number of daughters’ deaths with respect to an excess of 
female births, and societal discrimination against young females at the mean of the regressors, 
is presented in the second section of the table. The estimation uses the Zero-Inflated Poisson 
model. The specification for the probability of zero outcomes includes education. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-Square test compares the model specified in the corresponding 
column with the unconditional model. The p-value associated with this test informs whether, 
as a whole, the model is statistically significant. The Vuong (1989) test compares the Zero-
Inflated Poisson model with the standard Poisson model: large positive (negative) values favor 
the Zero-Inflated Poisson (standard Poisson) model, while absolute values below 2 do not 
favor any model. Akaike information criterion (AIC) based on the likelihood framework, and 
Schwartz information criterion (BIC) based on the Bayesian framework compare nested 
models; lower values imply an increased explanatory power.  
* p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Table 6: Robustness Analysis (IV): Role of family size and base neglect.  
Sample of mothers aged 15–49, India 2005–2006. 
  Dependent variable: number of daughters who died before age 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Regressors:       
Unwanted daughters (UD) 0.004***  (0.001) 0.023*** (0.001) 0.026*** (0.001) 
Societal discrimination 
(D) 
0.043*** (0.008) 0.090*** (0.009) 0.100*** (0.009) 
Cross-partial derivative 
derivative with UD and D 
 
-0.023*** 
 
(0.003) 
 
-0.022*** 
 
(0.003) 
 
-0.011** 
 
(0.004) 
Control variables Except sons deaths Except family size Except son deaths 
and family size  
LR Chi-Square 4,130.70 (24)*** 3,473.97 (24)*** 3,176.72 (23)*** 
Vuong 3.52*** 3.72*** 4.15*** 
AIC 20,088.52 20,745.25 21,040.5 
BIC 20,322.94 20,979.67 21,266.24 
Observations: 43,576 43,576 43,576 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of daughters who died before age one. The 
columns present the marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths at the mean of the 
regressors. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. The cross-partial 
derivative of the expected number of daughters’ deaths with respect to an excess of female 
births, and societal discrimination against young females at the mean of the regressors, is 
presented in the second section of the table. The estimation employs the Zero-Inflated 
Poisson model. The specification for the probability of zero outcomes includes education. 
The likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-Square test compares the model specified in the corresponding 
column with the unconditional model. The p-value associated with this test informs whether, 
as a whole, the model is statistically significant. The Vuong (1989) test compares the Zero-
Inflated Poisson model with the standard Poisson model: large positive (negative) values 
favor the Zero-Inflated Poisson (standard Poisson) model, while absolute values below 2 do 
not favor any model.  Akaike information criterion (AIC) based on the likelihood 
framework, and Schwartz information criterion (BIC) based on the Bayesian framework 
compare nested models; lower values imply an increased explanatory power.  
* p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Table 7: Robustness Analysis (V): Role of Zero-Inflated Poisson model.  
Sample of mothers aged 15–49, India 2005–2006. 
  Dependent variable: number of daughters who died before age 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regressors:      
Unwanted daughters (UD) 0.004***  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Societal discrimination (D) 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Cross-partial derivative 
derivative with UD and D 
 
-0.018*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.021*** 
 
-0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Zero outcomes specification:     
Education: (School)      
  No school No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Residence: (Rural)      
  Urban No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geo. region: (Northwest)      
  East No No Yes Yes Yes 
  South No No Yes Yes Yes 
  Central No No Yes Yes Yes 
Durables No No No Yes Yes 
Caste: (Other)      
  Scheduled caste No No No No Yes 
  Scheduled tribe No No No No Yes 
Vuong  3.59*** 4.29*** 4.48*** 4.60*** 
AIC 20,135.25 20,066.68 20,046.13 20,044.34 20,042.73 
BIC 20,360.99 20,318.47 20,323.96 20,330.86 20,346.61 
Observations: 43,576 43,576 43,576 43,576 43,576 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of daughters who died before their first 
birthday. The columns present the marginal effects on the predicted number of deaths at the 
mean of the regressors. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses. The cross-
partial derivative of the expected number of daughters’ deaths, with respect to excess of 
female births and societal discrimination against young females at the mean of the 
regressors, is presented in the second section of the table. Except in column 1 (standard 
Poisson regression), the estimation employs the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) based on the likelihood framework, and Schwartz information 
criterion (BIC) based on the Bayesian framework compare nested models; lower values 
imply an increased explanatory power. * p < .01;  ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
 
